For decades, China’s engagement with Africa was characterized by large-scale infrastructure loans, resource-backed financing, and diplomatic overtures framed as "win-win" cooperation.
However, recent shifts in global trade dynamics - particularly the tentative U.S.-China Tariff Deal announced by The White House in June 2025 - have prompted Beijing to recalibrate its African strategy. The deal, which reduces U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods to 55 %, signals a potential easing of trade tensions but also compels China to diversify its economic partnerships beyond traditional Western markets.
Against this backdrop, Africa is emerging as a critical theater for China’s evolving economic statecraft. No longer content with being Africa’s largest creditor, China is increasingly positioning itself as the continent’s premier trade and investment partner, leveraging manufacturing relocations, digital infrastructure, and green energy projects to secure long-term influence.
This op-ed examines whether China’s pivot from aid-driven diplomacy to trade-centric engagement represents a genuine redefinition of Africa’s economic future - or simply a repackaging of neo-colonial extractivism.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: CHINA’S AID-FIRST APPROACH IN AFRICA
1. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Infrastructure Diplomacy
Since the early 2000s, China’s engagement in Africa has been dominated by concessional loans and infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From railways in Kenya to ports in Djibouti, these projects were often financed through resource-backed loans, locking African nations into long-term debt dependencies (Brautigam, 2020).
By 2023, China accounted for nearly 20% of Africa’s total external debt, with countries like Zambia and Angola facing severe repayment crises (World Bank, 2024).
2. The Limits of Debt-Driven Development
The sustainability of China’s aid-heavy model came under scrutiny as multiple African countries struggled with debt distress. Zambia’s 2020 default and Ethiopia’s debt restructuring negotiations exposed the risks of over-reliance on Chinese financing (Financial Times, 2024).
Critics argued that China’s approach mirrored colonial-era extraction, where infrastructure investments primarily facilitated resource exports rather than industrial self-sufficiency (Carmody, 2021).
THE SHIFT: FROM LOANS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT
1. The U.S.-China Tariff Deal and Its Implications for Africa
The White House’s June 2025 announcement of a partial tariff rollback (10%-50%) on Chinese goods has marked a turning point. While easing U.S.-China trade tensions, the deal also reinforced Beijing’s need to secure alternative markets amid lingering Western skepticism (Politico, 2025). Africa, with its growing consumer base and untapped manufacturing potential, became an attractive destination for Chinese firms seeking to bypass U.S. and EU trade barriers.
2. Manufacturing Relocations and Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
China is increasingly shifting low-end manufacturing to Africa to reduce costs and circumvent Western tariffs. Ethiopia’s Hawassa Industrial Park, Nigeria’s Lekki Free Trade Zone, and Tanzania’s Bagamoyo SEZ exemplify this trend (Brookings, 2025). These zones, often backed by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), aim to transform Africa into a global manufacturing hub - while ensuring Chinese firms retain control over supply chains.
3. Digital Expansion: Huawei, 5G, and the "Digital Silk Road"
Beyond physical infrastructure, China is deepening its footprint in Africa’s digital economy. Huawei’s dominance in African telecom networks and the rollout of 5G infrastructure underscore Beijing’s strategy of embedding Chinese technology standards across the continent (CSIS, 2024). This digital leverage grants China long-term influence over Africa’s data governance and cybersecurity policies.
IS THIS A TRUE PARTNERSHIP OR A NEW FORM OF DEPENDENCY?
1. Trade Imbalances and the Raw Materials Dilemma
Despite rhetoric of mutual benefit, Africa’s trade relationship with China remains skewed. In 2024, over 70% of African exports to China were raw materials (oil, minerals, timber), while Chinese exports to Africa were dominated by manufactured goods (UNCTAD, 2025). This imbalance perpetuates Africa’s role as a supplier of cheap commodities rather than an industrial peer.
2. Local Backlash and Debt Diplomacy Concerns
Some African governments are pushing back against perceived Chinese overreach. Kenya’s renegotiation of its Railway Debt and Ghana’s suspension of BRI projects reflect growing skepticism (Reuters, 2025). Meanwhile, the U.S. and EU are countering China’s influence through initiatives like the Global Gateway and Prosper Africa, offering alternative financing with stricter transparency clauses (European Commission, 2025).
CONCLUSION: A SUSTAINABLE MODEL OR STRATEGIC ADAPTATION?
China’s pivot from aid to trade in Africa is not purely altruistic - it is a calculated response to global economic pressures, including the U.S.-China tariff deal. While increased Chinese investment could spur industrialization, Africa must negotiate from a position of strength to avoid replicating past dependencies. The coming decade will determine whether this shift marks a genuine transformation in Africa’s economic trajectory or merely a more sophisticated iteration of extractive engagement.
References
Brautigam, D. (2020). The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press.
Brookings Institution. (2025). China’s SEZs in Africa: Industrialization or Exploitation?
Carmody, P. (2021). The New Scramble for Africa. Polity Press.
CSIS. (2024). Huawei in Africa: Digital Colonialism or Development Opportunity?
European Commission. (2025). Global Gateway: Europe’s Answer to the BRI.
Financial Times. (2024). Zambia’s Debt Crisis and the China Factor.
Politico. (2025). U.S.-China Tariff Deal: What It Means for Global Trade.
Reuters. (2025). African Nations Rethink Chinese Debt Amid Economic Strains.
UNCTAD. (2025). Africa-China Trade Dynamics: Trends and Imbalances.
World Bank. (2024). Africa’s Debt Sustainability in the Shadow of Chinese Loans.
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Author's Bio: Teddy Okello is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, Certified Professional Mediator, Commissioner for Oaths, and Founder of The Institute for Policy and Diplomacy, Nairobi, Kenya. His work and writings focuses on review, critique and development of national and regional frameworks for governance, finance, health, infrastructure, climate change/sustainable development, international trade, peace and security and geopolitics. His contacts are: Phone +254715310677. Email: instituteforpolicyanddiplomacy@gmail.com.